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This chapter was written for the ITF by Dr Vera Weghmann at CREW (Centre for 
Research on Employment & Work) at the University of Greenwich (https://www.
gre.ac.uk/business/research/crew/home) to inform policy proposals on public 
financing for the People’s Public Transport Policy (www.OPTpolicy.org). The ITF 
would like to thank CREW for its contribution.
Each chapter of the People’s Public Transport Policy focuses on different policy 
issues related to public transport. The chapters include case studies, as well as 
campaign materials and educational resources.
The ITF’s Our Public Transport (OPT) programme promotes a social model of 
public transport. A social model includes organisational and employment rights 
for workers and requires that any expansion of public transport guarantees 
decent jobs.
OPT:
•  works in target cities to strengthen the voices of workers in the development 
    of new urban transport modes, including bus rapid transit (BRT), 
   and in negotiating the transition from informal to formal work
•  campaigns to improve working conditions for all public transport workers –  
   informal transport workers in particular – through increasing their industrial      
   power. This includes building union networks in public transport multinational 
   corporations, developing alliances with passengers, communities and other 
   organisations and promoting women’s employment in public transport
•  works to develop an alternative public transport policy – one that is built on 
   public ownership, public financing, decent jobs and union rights for workers
www.OurPublicTransport.org
PUBLIC FINANCING
3
               Executive summary
1. Introduction 
2. Methodology
3. Why investing in public transport is worth it
3.1 Investing in mobility equality
3.2 Investing in health and safety
3.3 Redistributing investment for a better cost-benefit ratio
3.4 Investing in a diverse and growing public transport workforce
3.5 Investing in public transport
4. The problem with Public-Private Partnerships
5. Public financing alternatives
5.1 An overview of financial instruments for public transport 
5.2 Climate finance
5.3 Public-Public Partnerships
5.4 Participatory budgeting
5.5 Fare-free public transport
5.6 Remunicipalisation
6. Case studies – learning lessons on how (not) to finance public transport
6.1 Expensive privatisations
       Case study: High-speed Standard Gauge Railway, Kenya
       Case study: Seoul metro line, Korea 
6.2 Government subsidies and taxes
Case study: Switzerland
Case study: BRT infrastructure, Colombia
6.3 Cross-subsidising and Public-Public Partnerships
Case study: Munich, Germany
Case study: International Rail Link, France-Spain
6.4 Climate change and the funding of public transport
Case study: Tallinn, Estonia 
       Case study: Mexico
6.5 Insourcing public transport: renationalisation and remunicipalisation 
       Case study: East coast, UK 
      Case study: BRT, Fort McMurray, Canada
7.           Conclusion
8.          Policy recommendations for trade unions
            References
1
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
6
6
11
11
13
16
16
17
18
19
19
19
21
22
22
23
25
25
26
27
27
28
29
29
30
30
33
34
Contents
1PUBLIC FINANCING
1. 
A number of failed privatisation and Public-Private-
Partnerships (PPPs) in major national and international 
transport services have involved significant financial 
losses. Unrealistic bids made by the private sector 
in order to win contracts have led to failure on major 
routes. Privatisation has led to fragmented and 
inefficient rail systems. As with PPPs, governments 
have had to bear the risk, with failure leading to 
significant subsidies drawn from the taxpayer and 
passengers. 
2. 
Private sector financing has proven more expensive 
than the public sector alternative. Profit has 
been siphoned off to shareholders, leading to 
an underinvestment in services. The failure of 
privatisation and PPPs has led to public transport 
services bring renationalised or run as joint 
government ventures. 
3. 
Private sector financing, including PPPs, often come 
with social costs, such as poorer working conditions 
and risks to the health and safety of workers and 
passengers. The sub-contracting of infrastructure 
work removes the onus from organisations to ensure 
workforce equality and diversity. This has reproduced 
labour market inequalities based upon race and 
nationality, with particular implications for migrant 
workers engaged in casual work.
4. 
Public ownership puts quality of service before profit. 
Public subsidies are necessary to ensure the urban 
poor have access to transport.
Executive 
Summary
5. 
Coalitions of workers and civil society organisations 
have effectively campaigned for remunicipalisation. 
This has repeatedly been shown to lead to both 
improved working conditions and a better quality of 
service.
6. 
Direct democracy cases have shown that electorates 
will vote for the funding of public transport and even 
prioritise it over road construction.
7. 
Fuel and road taxes can provide finance for public 
transport infrastructure. The cross financing of public 
services can subsidise public transport. Munich’s 
electricity company has promoted renewable energy 
in metro systems, trams and electro buses via cross 
financing.
8. 
Fare-free public transport increases usage and 
reduces private car journeys. It can increase tax 
income for municipalities.
9. 
Switching to zero-emission technology may demand 
higher up-front costs but can be significantly cheaper 
in the long run. However, the evolution of this sector 
remains constrained currently because the high initial 
costs and low profit margins involved do not attract 
the  private sector to finance zero-emission transport.
This report offers insights into financing strategies for public transport using 10 international case studies. 
The lessons from these case studies can be utilised to create better policy coherence. For example: 
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1. 
Introduction
The purpose of this report is to provide an 
overview of different funding strategies for 
public transport and to examine different 
models of public transport financing to 
highlight global lessons that can be adapted 
to local contexts. 
Accessible public transport is fundamental 
to public health and social and economic 
equality. It is also integral to ensuring a 
sustainable environment and addressing 
climate change. Road traffic is a significant 
contributor to poor air quality and has 
reached intolerable levels in many of the 
world’s cities. Around 14 percent of total 
emissions currently come from transport, 
and road transport comprises three-quarters 
of that figure. Road transport emissions are 
rising faster than in any other sector. Since 
2010 emissions have risen by around 18 
percent.1 Globally, air pollution is the fourth 
highest cause of death.2 Annually, almost 
185,000 deaths can be directly attributed 
to pollution from vehicles.3 In the context of 
global climate change, investment in public 
transport is a matter of urgency. Research 
has shown that people that live in areas 
with high-quality transit tend to own fewer 
motor vehicles, drive less, and spend less 
on transport than they would in more car-
oriented locations.4 
The World Bank warns of the ‘underfunding 
trap’ of public transport, arguing that cities 
lack sustainable revenue to implement 
transportation improvements that will 
provide long-term savings and benefits. 
As a solution the World Bank promotes the 
‘beneficiary pays’ principle. At the core of 
this financing model lies Public-Private-
Partnerships (PPPs) that are paid for by 
passenger fees, and taxes.5  Like the World 
Bank, other international financing institutions 
(IFI) are quick to recommend private sector 
involvement to address the funding gap. 
However, research shows that PPPs are an 
expensive and risky way of financing public 
services.6  This report identifies effective 
alternative models.
This report will address the following research 
questions:
•  What are the main instruments used to      
   finance public transport?
•  What is the experience of privatised public  
   transport/PPPs?
•  What are the alternative public financing 
   instruments for public transport?
•  In what way are workers benefiting from 
   publicly financed public transport?
•  How can trade unions campaign for 
   the public financing of public transport?
 
2. 
Methodology
This report draws on reports, policy 
documents and academic articles, alongside 
newspapers and blogs, to provide an 
overview of the different mechanisms that 
finance public transport. Yet, conditions 
vary between countries and cities and it is 
therefore necessary to consider the specific 
context in which public transport operates 
and the different funding streams available for 
it. A case-study approach has been chosen 
to explore different funding options for public 
transport in different localised contexts and 
analyse their impact on service delivery and 
employment. The report considers 10 case 
studies across the world and covers different 
public transport services, such as rail, bus 
rapid transit (BRT) and metro. 
3. 
Why investment 
in public transport
is worth it
A good-quality transport system has multiple 
benefits that go beyond those to transport 
users. A functioning public transport system 
is vital for the economy and increases quality 
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It is clear that transport poverty is socially, 
temporally and geographically context-
specific.14 Therefore, there is no one global 
indicator to define and measure transport 
poverty.15 The Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) 
International Transport Forum uses the 
‘Housing and Transport Index’ to measure 
transport affordability. This indicator classifies 
transport as affordable if households spend 
up to 15 percent of their income on it (and 
30 percent of their income on housing).16 
While there is no indicator to measure 
transport affordability or transport poverty 
in low-income countries, the United Nation’s 
(UN) Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
recognise the connection between a lack of 
public transport and poverty. In target 11.2 
of the SDGs, the aim is to provide access to 
safe, affordable, accessible and sustainable 
transport systems for all, improving road 
safety, notably by expanding public transport, 
with special attention to the needs of those 
in vulnerable situations, women, children, 
persons with disabilities and older persons.17  
3.2                                                                                                               
INVESTING IN HEALTH AND SAFETY
Public transport is a health and safety issue. 
The absence of public transport is connected 
to transport-related accidents. Globally the 
number of road traffic deaths was 1.25 million 
in 2013 alone.18 This marked an increase of 
32 percent in comparison to 2010. Strikingly, 
road traffic death rates in high-income 
countries were less than half than those in low 
and middle-income countries. The poor are 
especially affected as almost 50 percent of all 
road traffic deaths occur among pedestrians, 
cyclists, and motorcyclists.19
Investment in transport is also a gender issue. 
Six out of 10 women in major Latin-American 
cities report that they have been physically 
harassed on public transport.20 Personal 
security issues constrain women’s mobility. 
As such it is crucial to invest in the security of 
public transport so that women can access it 
without the fear of victimisation.21
of life, as it allows people access to work, 
education and leisure activities and improves 
air quality. Public transport is also integral to 
the fight against climate change. Financing 
public transport means investing in the 
environment and future generations.7
3.1        
INVESTING IN MOBILITY EQUALITY
In light of the speed of urbanisation, the 
establishment, maintenance and extension 
of a high-quality transport system is a priority 
for cities across the world. More than half 
the world’s population (55 percent) live in 
urban areas and by 2050 this is expected to 
increase to 68 percent.8 Without a functioning 
and expansive transport system the mobility 
of poor and marginalised communities is 
restricted. A two-tier transport system is the 
consequence in many cities across the globe. 
For example, while in a car-dependent city 
such as Los Angeles, US, the urban poor 
rely on a patchy public transport  system,9 in 
London, UK, low-paid workers cannot afford 
the metro and are dependent on buses to 
travel large distances to work.10 In many 
developing cities the poor often do not have 
access to reliable and affordable public 
transportation at all.11 As such, a lack of public 
transport also fosters inequalities in economic 
and social advancement.12  
Transport poverty or mobility poverty are 
terms that are often used to describe the 
deprivation that is caused by not having 
access to transport and to raise awareness 
about its implications. There is no clear 
definition of transport poverty, but it usually 
refers to people or households unable to 
make the journeys necessary to meet their 
needs (whether for income-generation, 
healthcare or participation in society).13 
However, it is unclear from this definition 
how far transport poverty is the result of a 
lack of transport supply, personal mobility 
impairments or financial constraints that 
prevent people from accessing it. 
PUBLIC FINANCING
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3.3       
REDISTRIBUTING INVESTMENT FOR                
A BETTER COST-BENEFIT RATIO
Despite the negative consequences of car     
usage on road safety and the environment 
and the relative benefits of public transport,        
existing subsidies for the road network and 
private cars far outstrip subsidies for public  
transport.22  Car users do not pay for the 
costs of driving, especially when congestion 
is taken into account. This raises the question 
of whether money in transport is well spent. 
Public transport has a better ‘cost-benefit 
ratio’ as it benefits the entire population, while 
cars benefit a minority of users and trips (See 
figure 1, which depicts explicit and implicit 
costs of cars compared to public transport). 
When considering investment possibilities for 
public transport it is therefore necessary to 
simultaneously critically assess the (indirect 
and direct) subsidies for cars. It is often the 
case, that expansion of the road network 
is funded from the general tax base, while 
public transport is underfunded. In these 
cases, it is legitimate to ask if the funding can 
be re-adjusted towards public transport to 
achieve a better cost-benefit ratio.
Figure 1: total costs (explicit and implicit) and benefits of cars compared with public transport 
Source:The World Bank, Sustainable Urban Transport Financing From The Sidewalk To The Subway, 2016 23
Costs        Benefits
Explicit
Implicit
Car Public Transport
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3.4 
INVENSTING IN A DIVERSE AND GROWING 
PUBLIC TRANSPORT WORKFORCE 
A reduction in car travel and a transfer to 
public transport would result in a net increase 
in employment. On average, rail and bus 
travel generates more jobs per passenger 
kilometre than car travel. For example, 
research in the United States suggests that 
investing in public transportation produces 
twice as many jobs per dollar as investing in 
roads.24
However, rapid urbanisation, especially 
in middle and low-income countries, has 
led to a huge increase in the demand for 
transport services. In many cities across the 
world, local and central governments have 
not been able to keep up with this demand. 
In India, for example, the government has 
provided public transport services in the 
form of bus and rail-based transport in only 
65 cities out of 7,935 cities and towns (as of 
2011). The remainder of cities rely on walking, 
cycling, personal vehicles and informal public 
transport.25 N’Djamena, Chad’s capital and 
largest city, is wholly reliant on the informal 
public transport sector.26 It is therefore 
crucial that cities recognise the existence 
and the contribution of informal public 
transport services when developing policies 
and investment strategies in the sector.27
In many countries the transport industry is 
one of the largest areas of employment but 
worldwide most transport workers work in 
the informal sector. For example, in Uganda 
informal transport services were reported to 
be the second largest employment sector 
after agriculture in 2013. In Kampala alone, 
there were 120,000 boda-boda (motorcycle) 
operators.28 Generally, the working conditions 
for informal transport workers are very poor. 
Low wages, few benefits or social protections 
and long and irregular hours, as well as 
police harassment and criminal extortion are 
the norm in the sector.29 The formalisation 
of informal transport offers opportunities 
to extend and improve public transport 
services by building on existing structures 
and knowledge. Integration of the informal 
and formal systems can lead to better-quality 
transport overall. However, formalisation 
should not bring costs such as job losses or 
adversely affect the livelihoods of transport 
workers. Formalisation should be used as a 
tool to improve the working conditions of the 
workers. The example of Bogota (see section 
6.2.2) shows that additional government 
subsidies might be necessary here to 
strengthen a transport system that serves 
commuters as well as workers. 
Similarly, gig-economy transport attempts 
to portray itself as a substitute to public 
transport.30
In recent years there has been a steep rise in 
‘on-demand’ transport and services across 
the world. Uber alone records 3 million drivers 
worldwide31 and Lyft has 1.4 million drivers.32 
In other words, these operators have become 
an integral and fast-growing part of the global 
transport workforce, yet their drivers face 
inadequate pay and little-to-no benefits. In 
Austin, Texas, US taxi drivers – both digital 
and off-line drivers – organised to campaign 
for better wages and working conditions. 
They successfully set up their own taxi 
cooperative and Uber and Lyft temporarily 
left the city. The cooperative model enables 
taxi drivers to control their wages and 
working conditions.33 Other examples of 
cooperative taxis that were formed as an 
alternative to exploitative players such as 
Uber and Lyft, include Union Cab in Madison, 
Wisconsin; Coop Taxi in Montréal, Canada; 
and COOP Taxi in Seoul, South Korea.34 
These examples highlight the impact that 
the digital transport economy has had on its 
workers. Its integration into the existing public 
transport system will depend on trade union 
representation and support of these workers. 
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3.5 
INVENSTING IN PUBLIC TRANSPORT
The preceding sections show that investment 
in public transport is key – but where should 
it come from? Across the world – whether 
operated by public or private companies – 
public transport is subsidised. In the United 
States, for example, public funding covers 
57-89 percent of the operating costs of bus 
services and in the EU, operating costs are 
covered by public funds in the range of 23-50 
percent, depending on the financing system 
within the particular EU member state.35
The World Bank highlights the ‘underfunding 
trap’ in public transport. This refers to 
the shortfall in many cities across the 
world between the revenue from small-
scale transport systems and investment 
requirements in the infrastructure and 
assets of the system. International financial 
institutions (IFI) and the World Bank are 
quick to call on the private sector to rescue 
public transport from this ‘underfunding 
trap’. In section 4, we addresses why this is 
a short-sighted solution that will not lead to 
sustainable public transport for all. In section 
5, we showcase alternative funding solutions 
for public transport. 
4. 
THE PROBLEMS WITH
Public-Private
Partnerships (PPPs) 
A public-private partnership (PPP) is a form 
of privatisation. A PPP is a contract between 
government and a private company under 
which a private company finances, builds, 
and operates some element of a public 
service and is paid over a number of years, 
either through charges paid by passengers 
(often called a concession), or by payments 
from the public authority, or a combination of   
both.36  In 2018, the UN concluded in a report 
on poverty and human rights that:
Privatization often involves the systematic 
elimination of human rights protections 
and further marginalization of the interests 
of low-income earners and those living in 
poverty.” 37
Yet, privatisation is encouraged across the 
globe, based on the belief that the tendering 
of public transport to private providers 
reduces costs and increases efficiency. A 
study by Wallis and Hensher (2005), which 
covered tendering in public transport (mainly 
bus services) in 10 countries and 20 separate 
tender programs, is frequently quoted to 
support this belief. They found that in the 
first tendering round, significant cost savings 
could be achieved. For example, in the 
case of the UK, between 50-55 percent; in 
Scandinavia between 20-30 percent; in the 
USA 30-46 percent, and in Australia 22-38 
percent.38
However, subsequent research, carried out 
by the same authors, showed their previous 
study was overly optimistic. In fact, when they 
looked at the costs in real terms over a longer 
time period (beyond the first tendering round), 
it became clear that there were no significant 
price reductions. Wallis and Hensher (2005) 
found that in the second tendering round, 
costs increased in comparison to the first 
round. Among other reasons, this was 
because bidders usually avoided the inclusion 
of long-term costs in the initial tender, but 
the subsequent pressure to replace assets 
became greater. From the third round of 
tendering, costs remained stable in real 
terms.39 As such, beyond the initial one-off 
price reduction, no sustainable cost savings 
were achieved through tendering in bus 
services. More recent research has confirmed 
that privatisation does not automatically lead 
to cost savings. In 2011 another wide-ranging 
study assessed bus services in 73 cities, 
across all continents, and with different types 
of bus operators. It concluded there was no 
significant difference in efficiency between 
public and private operators.40
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Where a difference can be seen between 
public and private operators, however, is in 
the quality of the service, its safety and the 
pay and conditions of its bus drivers.41 When 
profits and cost reductions became the first 
priority of a private operator, this was found to 
be at the cost of wider transit objectives, such 
as addressing congestion, environmental 
impact and social equity.42  
In the USA, a study of over 400 public 
transport authorities over nine years found 
that privatisation had produced no significant 
cost savings. While private contractors were 
on average 5.5 percent cheaper, the study 
also found the lower wages in the private 
sector were equivalent to a reduction in costs 
of about 18.6 percent.43 Similarly, research on 
the privatised BRT in Bogota, Colombia (see 
6.2.2) revealed that the operating company 
prioritised financial savings over good 
working conditions and service quality.44
In addition, private operators often cherry 
pick the most profitable services. For 
example, a study carried out in India found 
that private bus operators appeared to be 
more efficient but noted that this could have 
been due to the operator’s selection of more 
profitable routes, as well as cuts to the wages 
and conditions of its workers.45 
Research on the benefits of privatisation 
often focuses on profitable areas such as 
large cities, while non-metropolitan areas are 
ignored. A recent study focused on England 
and showed that privatisation led to fare 
increases outside of London while services 
worsened. Consequently, bus use fell. Bus 
trips in English metropolitan areas outside of 
London halved from about 2 billion per year 
in 1985 to 1 billion per year in 2016 (see figure 
2). In the big cities outside London, the initial 
small rise in bus use was replaced by a fall of 
13 percent in just one year. This was followed 
by a continuous downward trend.46 
Figure 2: annual passenger journeys on local bus services in England
Source: Taylor and Sloman, Building A World-Class Bus System For Britain, 2016: 
http://www.transportforqualityoflife.com/u/files/160120_Building_a_world-class_bus_system_for_Britain_FINAL1.pdf
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Fundamental to a privatised, deregulated 
bus system are the dividends paid out to 
shareholders – money that could be re-
invested to improve and extend the service. In 
the UK, the bus companies’ average operating 
profit between 2003 and 2013 was GBP297 
million per year (USD393 million). Almost all 
of this – on average, GBP277 million per year 
(USD366 million) – was paid out as dividends 
to shareholders. In other words, there was 
a loss of GBP2.8 billion (USD3.9 billion) that 
could have been used to enhance the public 
transport system but was instead paid out to 
shareholders. In contrast, Reading, a town in 
southern England, owns its buses municipally. 
As it does not pay out dividends, Reading is 
able to invest an additional GBP3 million per 
year (USD4 million) in the bus network, thus 
improving the town’s bus service. This is one 
reason why the town enjoys high levels of bus 
use.47
The profit motivation of private bus 
companies deters them from making the 
necessary long-term investments required 
to provide more environmentally sustainable 
services. This is illustrated in the case of 
Mexico City (see section 6.4.2).
Regarding rail services, the situation is even 
more severe. A study of rail PPPs across the 
globe came to the conclusion that most 
PPPs ended up as financial failures and 
thus a constraint upon public budgets.48 
Again, the UK has been at the forefront of 
rail privatisation and its failure. Not only is 
it well documented that costs rose after 
privatisation,49 but the licensing system was 
manipulated in a way that allowed public 
subsidies to be paid out to shareholders, 
while company debts rose to unsustainable 
levels and eventually required a bail out by 
the public. A company – as in the catastrophic 
case of the East Coast Line (see section 6.5.1) 
– is able to walk away from a franchise without 
serious penalty despite overly optimistic 
projections on which the contract was won 
proving to have been fantasy.50 Moreover, 
McKay and Moore’s report (2017) on the 
consequences of outsourcing in UK rail found 
considerable evidence that the outcome 
for workers, the services they provided and 
upon wider communities was overwhelmingly 
negative.51 
In Brazil rail privatisation led to redundancies 
– both in preparation for the privatisation and 
following it.52  
In Estonia a study on rail privatisation found 
that it led to reduced services for passengers 
and increased public spending. Profits were 
directed towards the company owners rather 
than making necessary investments in the 
service. Estonia’s rail privatisation also led 
to significant job cuts. Both passengers and 
workers had protested the privatisation of 
their rail services before it was carried out.53
The Asian Development Bank flags up the 
high failure rate of PPPs worldwide and 
especially in developing Asia, where the 
transport system is most affected (see 
figure 3). Its analysis is based on the World 
Bank’s private participation in infrastructure 
database. Between 1991-2015 there were 
6,273 PPP projects of which only 216 were 
completed while 259 PPPs were cancelled 
by the private sector and 67 were stressed 
(meaning either the public sector partner 
or the private sector operator requested 
a contract termination or international 
arbitration to settle a dispute). In other words, 
between 1991 and 2015, more PPPs have 
failed than have succeeded.54 
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Even the World Bank admits that across 
urban rail, metros and commuter rail systems, 
many of the PPP projects have failed, as it 
concludes:
Early urban rail projects developed through 
PPPs in the 1990s and early 2000s were 
far from delivering optimal VfM [Value for 
Money] given delays in construction, higher-
than-anticipated project costs, or lower-
than-expected demand. In many cases, 
public project implementing agencies had 
to take over the remaining development of 
the urban rail project.” 55
Despite the many failures of PPPs in urban rail 
there has been a large increase in the number 
of urban rail projects with private participation 
since the early 2000s and the World Bank 
continues to promote PPPs as a financing 
option for urban rail. Following this advice, 
governments both in high-income and in low 
and middle-income countries are increasingly 
using public-private partnerships (PPPs) to 
develop urban rail projects. 
Figure 3: cancelled PPP projects 
by sector in developing Asia 
between 1991 and 2015
Source: Asian Development Bank, 2018
SECTOR
Water and 
sewage
18.5
Energy
23.4
Transport
41.8
ICT
16.3
Figure 4: urban rail projects involving private participation in low- and middle-income 
economies, 1990-2016
Source: Pulido, The Urban Rail Development Handbook, 2018
N
um
be
r o
f p
ro
je
ct
s
A
m
ou
nt
 o
f i
nv
es
tm
en
t (
U
SD
, m
ill
io
ns
)
35,000
30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
0
1990-95 1996-2000 2001-05
3
4
5
11
15
2006-10 2011-16
2,554 2,541 1,957
7,442
30,822
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
Investment amount      Number of projects
PUBLIC FINANCING
10
Infrastructure PPPs in transport are rising in 
emerging markets and developing economies 
(EMDE) (see figure 4). While most of the PPPs 
concern road construction (in particular 
highway programmes in India and Brazil), 
railroads, seaports, and airports are the next 
largest destination for PPP investment. The 
top five countries for PPP investment are 
Argentina, Brazil, China, India, and Mexico. 
Brazil closed on 23 mega transport deals 
topping USD 1 billion each, exceeding all 
other EMDEs combined.56
Despite the well-reported problems with PPPs 
it is surprising to see that the trend towards 
PPPs in transport has accelerated rather than 
reversed. There are several explanations for 
their continuous rise. First, PPPs are deeply 
ingrained in neoliberal policymaking, which 
assumes that market forces and competition 
will lead to efficiency, innovation and 
growth and that the government should, 
therefore, intervene as little as possible.
As such, there is an ideological component 
to their championing; questioning PPPs 
may be perceived as doubting neoliberal 
policymaking as a whole. To avoid that 
ideological taboo, studies usually excuse the 
failures of PPPs by suggesting tweaks to the 
existing model rather than an alternative to 
it.58 Second, the 2008 financial crisis added 
a practical dimension to the continued rise 
in PPPs, namely that they provide a way to 
finance infrastructure and public services 
while keeping (official) debt figures low. 
This is important for countries bound by 
donor conditionality or, as in the case of 
the EU, where countries can be fined for 
not complying with the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure (EDP). PPPs still enable money 
to be borrowed but allows governments 
to invest while complying with the debt 
and deficit thresholds established in the 
Maastricht Treaty.59 In other words, officially 
PPPs do not have a direct impact on 
government debt, even though in reality the 
government is still paying for the investment 
through taxation. It is also a more expensive 
type of borrowing, as elsewhere governments 
can usually borrow at lower interest rates.60
Figure 5: investments in PPP infrastructure projects in the transport sector, top 5 countries 
and rest of EMDEs, 1991-2015 (2015 USD million)
Source: World Bank and PPIAF 2016 57
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5.
PUBLIC FINANCING
ALTERNATIVES
5.1                                                                                       
AN OVERVIEW OF FINANCIAL                                   
INSTRUMENTS FOR PUBLIC TRANSPORT
Broadly speaking there are three different 
types of funding streams for public transport:
•  beneficiary fees (for example fares, parking   
   fees)
•  taxes (for example income tax, property  
   tax, carbon tax, pay roll tax, vehicle tax)
•  national and international grants and debt
Beneficiary fees
A common mechanism to fund public 
transport is through fares and increases 
to fares. However, net social benefits can 
outweigh whatever additional fares may 
generate as income. To address inequality, 
for example, it is crucial that the fare system 
is progressive, ensuring people from poorer 
backgrounds are not priced out of using 
the service. Another net social benefit is 
the affect of fares upon the environment; 
increasing fares could incentivise car usage 
which would have a detrimental affect on the 
environment. To address these interrelated 
interests, some cities and countries have 
promoted free public transport (see section 
5.5). 
Taxes
Earmarking revenue income from specific 
(local) taxes can be a strategic way to 
guarantee the continuous funding for 
public transport. For example, in France the 
Versement Transport (VT) is a tax placed on 
employers within a public transport service 
area. In this way, funds from businesses that 
profit from good transport links are used to 
build and maintain the transport services 
within a certain area.61 
Similarly, in Vienna the metro has been 
financed by a local tax on large employers. 
This generated an annual income of Eur70 
million (USD79 million).62 In Brazil, the federal 
government mandates that any employer with 
more than 10 formal employees, and a home-
to-work trip for an employee that costs more 
than six percent of the employee’s salary, 
must pay the difference between six percent 
of the salary and the cost of the ticket. 
Payroll taxes are based on the assumption 
that employers benefit from good public 
transport.
Property-related taxes could be used 
specifically to invest in public transport. 
Earmarked property taxes to fund public 
transport are common in the US, for example 
in Minneapolis and New York. Also, in 
Mumbai, India, Osaka, Japan, and Barcelona, 
Spain, revenue from property taxes funds 
public transport.63 The underlying assumption 
is that the value of property increases when 
it is better connected to public transport. As 
property ownership increases with income 
this is a relatively progressive tax. However, 
such a tax can be very burdensome for low-
income households and potentially force 
them out of the area. 
National and international grants and debt
National and international grants and loans 
provide another pathway to making long-
term investments into public transport. 
However, international loans often come 
with conditions or strong incentives to 
increase private sector involvement in public 
transport. As outlined in section 4, private 
sector loans are usually more expensive than 
governmental bonds (loans taken out by the 
government). 
The World Bank’s ‘who benefits pays’ 
framework, recommends that those that 
benefit from urban transport services should 
pay for their costs. While the specifics vary 
between countries and cities the World Bank 
suggests three types of benefits: 
•  general benefits, which are received by 
   society in general
•  direct benefits, which are received mainly  
   by users of the transport system
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•  indirect benefits, whereby non users of 
   the system still perceive benefits from the  
   improvements 
Table 1 below provides an overview of the 
different sources of funding associated with 
each beneficiary group. While these financing 
instruments may be usefully applied in 
different local contexts, two major concerns 
with the ‘who benefits pays’ framework need 
to be highlighted:
•  a strong inclination for private sector 
   participation
•  a tendency to argue for cost recovery
The who benefits pays framework is short-
sighted. It does not consider the wider 
societal benefits of public transport, 
including to the environment and future 
generations. Instead of aiming for short-
term cost recovery (where consumers pay 
the price), governments could explore 
redistributing funding from road building 
towards public transport and/or earmarking 
specific income streams for public transport 
(see also section 6.2). 
Overall, the financing of public transport 
could be seen as inseparable from fiscal 
revenue. Finding the finance for public 
transport would therefore be integral to 
progressive tax reform and tackling tax 
avoidance. It is estimated that globally 
USD240 billion is lost every year in tax 
revenue through various forms of tax 
avoidance and evasion, with the majority of 
these losses being in low, lower, and middle-
income countries.64 This is money that could 
be invested in public transport and other 
public services instead. 
The next sections will outline a number of 
alternative mechanisms for the mobilisation 
and redistribution of funds for public transport. 
Table 1: financing instruments by type of beneficiary
Source: World Bank, From Sideways To Subways, 2016
GENERAL BENEFIT INSTRUMENTS
Beneficiary: general public
Public transport subsidies
Property taxes
National and international grants 
and loans
Climate-related financial instruments
Global Environment Facility (GEF)
Clean Technology Fund
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
Public-Private-Partnerships (PPPs) 
for public transport
DIRECT BENEFIT INSTRUMENTS
Beneficiary: direct beneficiaries 
(users, drivers, passengers)
Parking charges
Road pricing
Congestion charges
Fuel taxes and surcharges
Vehicle taxation
Farebox revenue
PPPs for urban roads
INDIRECT BENEFIT INSTRUMENTS
Beneficiary: indirect beneficiaries 
(firms, land and property owners, developers)
Advertising
Employer contributions
Added value capture mechanisms
Land-value taxes/betterment levies
Tax increment financing
Special assessment
Transportation utility fees
Land asset management
Developer extractions
Development impact fees
Negotiated exactions
Joint developments
Air rights
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5.2                                                                                       
CLIMATE FINANCE
The Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement 
call for financial assistance from countries 
with more financial resources to those that 
are less endowed and more vulnerable. This 
recognises that climate finance is needed 
for mitigation, as large investments are 
required to significantly reduce emissions. 
The UN refers to climate finance as the local, 
national or transnational financing – drawn 
from public, private and alternative sources of 
financing – that seeks to support mitigation 
and adaptation actions that will address 
climate change.65 
The majority of climate finance comes from 
private sources. In 2015 private climate 
finance reached a record high of USD299 
billion (see figure 6). In 2015 and 2016 public 
climate finance commitments of USD139 
billion per year were made. However, there 
are limitations in tracking the data of private 
finance in transport. Current research 
suggests that it is mostly public climate 
finance that is spent on sustainable transport, 
which is estimated to be around USD22 billion 
annually (see figure 7). While this is just a 
small proportion of the climate finance funds, 
it marks an increase from 2013/2014 when the 
annual investment in sustainable finance was 
USD 19 billion.66
Figure 6:
Breakdown of global climate finance 
by public and private actors 2012-2016 
(USD billions)
Source: Global Landscape Of Climate Finance 2017, 
Climate Policy Initiative
Total 
Climate 
Finance
2012           2013            2014            2015           2016
Private
actors
Public
actors
224
136
199
143
241
147
299
138
242
141
359 359 388 437 383
Figure 7: 
Accounting gaps in tracking climate 
finance
Source: Global Landscape Of Climate Finance 2017. 
Climate Policy Initiative
ESTIMATE
(not included 
in Landscape)
TRACKED NOT 
TRACKED
Renewable 
Energy
Energy
Efficiency
Transport
Land Use
Adaptation
Private Public
(DFIs & 
international 
finance)
Public
(Domestic 
Finance)
270
231*
33
39
22
3
22
All figures in USD Billions *Source: IEA WEIO 2017
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In the public transport sector, climate finance 
can be used to support land transport 
activities that will reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. The requirement is that the 
funds are used for specific climate change 
mitigation or adaptation interventions. Both 
developed and developing countries can 
apply for climate finance.67  In particular, 
much climate finance goes into investments 
for bus rapid transit (BRT) systems, which are 
mass transit systems using energy-efficient 
electric vehicles (EEEV). BRT systems mimic 
metro or light rail transit systems and are 
considered among the most cost-effective 
public transport systems in the world. For 
example, 10 percent of the funding for the 
BRT in Bogota, Colombia was funded through 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
(see section 6.2.2). Furthermore, the Clean 
Technology Fund (CTF) provided finance for 
the BRT in Cebu, Philippines.68 
Figure 8: types of climate change mitigation activities that can be supported by climate finance
Source: Binsted, Accessing Climate Finance For Sustainable Transport: A Practical Overview, SUT Technical Document, GIZ, 2013
Concepts &
Plans
finance of 
organisation
Infrastructure
mainly initial 
investments
Operation &
Management
continuous financial 
flows
Financing Technology
Transfer
Capacity
Building
• Integrated urban and 
  transport plans
• Guidlines & Rules
• Outlining Transport 
  system (e.g. BRT)
   Construction of...
• bus lanes, rail, stops
• NMT networks
• interchanges
   (integration of models)
   Construction of...
• Bus lanes, rail, stops
• NMT networks
• Interchanges
   (Integration of models)
• transport modelling
• data gathering 
  (e.g. traffic counting)
• efficient vehicles 
   and retrofitting
• e-ticketing
• passenger 
  information systems
• Intel. Transport 
  Systems (ITS)
• charging systems
• organisation 
  development
• training
• setting up networks
• MRV concept
• green public   
   procurement
• building standards
• maintenance &  
   inspection
• system optimisation
• eco driving
There is a growth in institutions and 
organisations that provide climate finance. 
Those that provide financial resources for 
climate change mitigation activities in the 
transport sector are listed in order of the size 
of the funds available: 
•  Global Environment Facility (GEF) 
•  Clean Technology Fund (CTF)
•  Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA)
•  IDB Sustainable Environmental Climate 
   Change Initiative (SECCI)
•  ADB Climate Change Fund (CCF)
•  ADB Clean Energy Fund (CEF) 
•  Japan Fast Start Fund Initiative
•  International Climate Initiative (ICI)
•  Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
•  Voluntary carbon market
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Most climate finance is directed to local, 
regional and national governments as well as 
the private sector. Climate finance, therefore, 
offers opportunities for the funding of 
sustainable transport.
Caution is required, however, as it provides 
an entry point for private sector involvement 
in public transport. Several climate finance 
schemes specifically encourage privatisation. 
SOURCE OF CLIMATE FINANCE
IDB Sustainable Energy and 
Climate Change Initiative
Global Environment Facility
Clean Technology Fund
Global Climate Change Alliance
ADB Climate Change Fund
ADB Clean Energy Fund
Japan Fast Start Fund Initiative
International Climate Initiative
Clean Development Mechanism
Voluntary carbon market
a) it should be noted that grants from this source are only available for project preparation
4.1.1
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Table 2
An overview of what type of 
climate finance support is available 
by intervention type
Source: Binsted, Accessing Climate Finance For 
Sustainable Transport: A Practical Overview, SUT 
Technical Document, GIZ, 2013
For example, PPPs are one eligibility criteria 
to access funding from the Inter-American 
Development Bank’s (IDB) Sustainable Energy 
and Climate Change Initiative (SECCI).69 This 
reinforces the research findings of several 
scholars who have observed a strong trend 
towards neo-liberalisation within global 
climate policy.70
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5.3                                                                                       
PUBLIC-PUBLIC PARTNERSHIPS
PuPs are the collaboration between two 
or more public partners to improve the 
capacity and effectiveness of one partner 
in providing public services. PuPs are peer 
relationships forged around common values 
and objectives, which exclude profit seeking.71 
The absence of commercial considerations 
allows partners in PuPs to reinvest all available 
resources into the development of local 
capacity. Building mutual trust translates 
into long-term capacity gains, and incurs low 
transaction costs.
In practice, the work of PuPs can be divided 
into five broad categories:
•  training and developing human resources
•  technical support on a wide range of issues 
•  improving efficiency and building   
   institutional capacity
•  financing services
•  improving participation
To date, no study has been conducted 
on PuPs in the transport sector. However, 
research on other public services where 
they have been utilised offers suggestions 
on how PuPs can be used to finance public 
services and thus provide lessons for their 
engagement in the transport sector. 
Common ways to initiate PuPs are through 
city-to-city partnerships. For example, 
Seville, Spain, developed several PuPs that 
were motivated by international solidarity. 
A PuP between Seville and Ciudad Sandino, 
Nicaragua led to the establishment of 
a municipal water company with public 
participation. There are also country-to-
country PuPs. For example, a partnership 
between Finland and Vietnam was developed 
though the Finnish bilateral development 
agency (FINNIDA) and led to a more efficient 
water supply system and workforce training. 
Between 1990 and 1995, 50 percent of the 
investment of the Vietnamese water company, 
Hai Phong Water Supply Company (HPWSC), 
came from this PuP.72  
PuPs can also be a means to protect a public 
company that is threatened with privatisation. 
For example, in Cali, Colombia in 2016, 
Emcali, a municipal public service provider 
of water, electricity and telecommunications, 
was challenged by the municipal government 
to privatise its telecommunications unit, as it 
was deemed unprofitable. However, the trade 
union, Sintraemcali, resisted the privatisation 
and successfully proposed the establishment 
of a PuP. Consequently, Antel, Uruguay’s 
state-owned telecommunications company, 
which provides the world’s most inclusive 
and America’s fastest national broadband 
network, set up a PuP with Emcali. The 
privatisation was stopped.73 
5.4                                                                                       
PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING
The practice of participatory budgeting was 
first introduced in Porto Alegre, Brazil over 
30 years ago. Its aim is to enable local people 
to have democratic control over municipal 
budgets; ensuring public spending is in line 
with the interests of the community. Since 
then many municipalities have adopted it 
across the world. It is estimated that there 
are currently over 7,000 participatory 
budgeting projects globally.74 Research has 
shown that participatory budgeting has led 
to improvements in the provision of basic 
services. Studies have also shown that in 
cities that have introduced participatory 
budgeting, tax revenues increased and tax 
delinquency dropped – presumably because 
the process allows the population to become 
aware of municipal resources, their limits and 
their origin.75
Through participatory budgeting in Scotland, 
GBP500,000 (USD666,000) was allocated to 
be spent on bus transport in the Western    
Isles.76 Switzerland also has a long history 
of direct democracy and most cantons and 
communes hold optional or even mandatory 
referendums on financial matters. This has led 
to the redistribution of funds to finance public 
transport (see section 6.2.1). 
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5.5                                                                                       
FARE-FREE PUBLIC TRANSPORT
Where a good public transport system 
exists, the abolition of fares can tackle 
issues of social exclusion, inequality, and 
transport poverty. By making public transport 
accessible and free of charge, the market-
oriented focus on profitability and demand 
management is challenged. Public transport 
is thus no longer seen as a commodity, but 
as a common good, similar to public services 
such as parks, sidewalks, cycling paths, 
streetlights, libraries and playgrounds.77
It is often argued that cities cannot afford 
to offer public transport for free as the 
passenger fares are crucial for financing 
the running and maintenance of public 
transport. However, nearly 100 cities across 
the world have decided to make public 
transport fare-free and the trend continues. 
With 56 instances in effect, Europe has the 
most locations of fare-free public transport, 
of which 21 are in Poland and 20 in France. 
Tallinn, Estonia, which is home to about 
450,000 people, is the largest city in the 
world with a fully fare-free public transport 
system (see section 6.4.1). In the United 
States there are 27 fare-free public transport 
systems, yet these are mostly in small towns 
and colleges where the cost of fare collection 
would be higher than the income it would 
generate. Brazil has 11 fare-free systems. 
There are also two in China and one in 
Australia.78 Recently Dunkirk joined this trend 
and became France’s biggest fare-free public 
transport city.79 Paris is also considering the 
introduction of a free-fare transport system80 
and Luxemburg recently announced it would 
become a fare-free country by 2020.81
Table 3: list of full fare-free public transport systems across the world
Source: Keblowski, More Than Just Riding Without A Ticket? Exploring The Geography Of Fare, 2017
Full fare-free public transport cases
Year Total EuropeNorth 
America
South
America
AustraliaAsia
1
6
12
25
56
96
–
2
4
7
27
56
1
4
8
16
24
26
–
–
–
2
5
11
–
–
–
–
–
1
–
–
–
–
1
2
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
2017
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Beyond full fare-free public transport there 
are several cities across the world where 
public transport is made freely available 
when air pollution reaches high levels. Cases 
in point are Seoul, South Korea82, Brussels, 
Belgium83 and Salt Lake City, USA84. In 
other words, fare-free transport is a known 
mechanism to promote the usage of public 
transport over car usage and thus it is an 
instrument to reduce air pollution.
Additionally, there are many cases of fare-
free public transport systems where specific 
groups of users (usually children, young 
people and students, and/or old people) 
travel for free.  For example, in Slovakia the 
railway network is free for children, students, 
retired persons and seniors. Also, in England, 
UK, travel on buses, the metro and commuter 
rail is free for people over 60.85
Experiments across the world show that 
public transport usage increases when public 
transport is made free. In Hasselt, Belgium, 
which had free transport from 1997 until 2013 
(16 years), public transport usage increased 
1,300 percent and the number of cars 
decreased. While more cyclists also switched 
to public transport, the total number of 
cyclists went up, presumably encouraged by 
the reduction of cars on the street.86 
However, following the global financial crisis, 
free public transport has placed demands on 
municipal budgets and in some cases cities 
could not generate enough funds to continue 
with free transport. In the case of Hasselt, 
Belgium, the cost of free transport rose from 
EUR967,000 (USD1.1 million) in 1997 to EUR3.5 
million in 2007 (USD3.8 million).87 Yet, Tallinn, 
Estonia shows that fare-free public transport 
can also help to generate new revenue that 
largely covers the reduced or eliminated 
income from fares. In Tallinn, the free public 
transport provided an incentive for previously 
unregistered citizens to register in order to be 
eligible to use it. This also meant that they had 
to pay city taxes and this provided the city 
with extra income to finance free transport 
(see section 6.2.2).
When the social and environmental benefits 
of free public transport, such as social 
inclusion and reduced emissions, are taken 
into account it becomes clear that that fare-
free public transport is a political rather than a 
financial question. 
5.6 REMUNICIPALISATION
Remunicipalisation refers to the return of 
privatised local and regional government 
services88 to full public ownership, 
management and democratic control. 
In 2017 a study reported 835 cases of 
remunicipalisation of public services involving 
more than 1,600 cities in 45 countries.89
A number of factors drive remunicipalisation. 
It is usually a response to the failures of 
privatisation in both high and low-income 
countries. However, austerity is also leading 
trade unions and governments to explore 
more effective and efficient uses of public 
money and resources. In many case, 
insourcing is the solution.90
Another reason to insource a service might 
simply be that public services are cheaper 
as they do not divert public money to 
shareholders. Therefore, local and regional 
governments can provide the service at 
a lower cost while continuing to maintain 
and improve it. Cost benefits have been 
the main motivation behind a number of 
remunicipalisation exercises. In Bergkamen, 
Germany, for example, remunicipalising 
the waste management service reduced its 
costs by 30 percent within four years, while 
service quality remained the same. The price 
drop was achieved solely by the removal of 
the profit motive.91 While there are similar 
trends in remunicipalisation across all utilities, 
section 6.2 focuses upon public transport.
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6.
Case studies –        
Learning lessons on 
how (not) to finance 
public transport
6.1 
EXPENSIVE PRIVATISATIONS
Case study: 
HIGH-SPEED STANDARD GAUGE 
RAILWAY, KENYA
Lesson 1: public transport funding that 
hinges on the awarding of a contract to a 
particular company puts that company in 
a powerful position where the potential for 
abuse is significant. Workers, communities 
and the environment are often the victims 
of this power dynamic.
Lesson 2: while conditional ‘government-
to-government’ procurement might 
appear to save costs, as the case of the 
SGR railway in Kenya shows, it can prove a 
costlier way to finance public transport. 
High-speed railway projects in Africa are 
on the rise (see Table 4). In 2017, Kenya 
opened a high-speed standard gauge 
railway (SGR) to link the capital, Nairobi, 
with the coastal town Mombasa.92 It was 
the first of a series of planned railway 
links in the East African region planned, 
constructed and operated by the 
China Railway and Bridge Cooperation 
(CRBC). The 472km project had a 
cost of USD3.2 billion. It was Kenya’s 
biggest infrastructure project since its 
independence.93 The railway was financed 
through a concessional loan from the Exim 
Bank of China, which included a condition 
that the engineering, procurement and 
construction contract would be awarded 
to a state-owned Chinese corporation. 
Following construction, the CRBC would 
operate the line for 10 years.94 This 
kind of financing, where projects are 
financed through concessional loans 
and grants from foreign governments 
conditional upon contracting a particular 
company, did not adhere to Kenyan 
procurement law.95 The Law Society of 
Kenya therefore went to the Kenyan High 
Court. It argued that the procurement 
method used for the SGR was not 
competitive and therefore contravened the 
procurement law. However, the court ruled 
in favour of the procurement method used 
for the SGR. This ruling set a precedent in 
Kenyan law that government procurements 
arising from negotiated grants or loans are 
exempt from the country’s procurement 
laws.96 
Such methods might offer an easy way 
to source the large-scale funds that are 
needed to invest in public transport 
– especially when new infrastructure 
projects are required. However, the 
CRBC charges approximately KES1 billion 
a month (USD 10 million) in operating 
costs for the new railway.97 Also, the 
construction cost of USD3.2 billion 
seems inflated, when compared to similar 
projects. Tanzania recently awarded a 
USD1.92 billion contract to a Turkish firm 
to build 422 kilometres of its rail link (50km 
less than the Mombasa-Nairobi link). Not 
only is Tanzania’s train line projected to be 
significantly cheaper in cost than Kenya’s 
SGR, but, running on electricity rather than 
diesel, it is also predicted to be a faster 
and a cleaner transport project overall.98
Besides the excessive cost of the project 
the SGR project also raised concerns in 
terms of:
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•  lack of transparency: the initial contract  
   and a subsequent one on the Nairobi-   
   Naivasha project included confidentiality 
   clauses, which meant Kenya could not 
   make contract details public unless  
   China agreed.99
•  dispute settlement arrangements: the 
   contract states Chinese laws will govern 
   the pact with all disputes arbitrated in 
   Beijing. This places Kenya in a very 
   vulnerable position.100
Table 4: Selected high-speed railway PPPs in Africa
Table 4: Selected high-speed railway PPPs in Africa
COUNTRY YEAR OF 
OPENING
  CONNECTION PROJECT 
COSTS
LENGTH 
OF PPP
  COMPANY FINANCE
South 
Africa102
2011 Johannesburg –
Pretoria
Eur 1.83 
billion 
(ZAR
26 
billion)
20 
years
Bomblea Consortium 
(Murray and Roberts 
33 percent Strategic 
Partners Group 25 
percent, Bombardier 
17 percent, Bouygues 
Travaux Publics, J and 
J group 8 percent)
/
Kenya103 2017 Nairobi – 
Mombasa
USD 3.2 
billion 
(KES
380.4 
billion)
10 
years
China Road and 
Bridge Corporation, 
a subsidiary of China 
Communications 
Construction Co.
China 
Exim Bank 
(90 percent)
Morocco104 2018 Casablanca – 
Tangier
USD 2bn Morocco’s nation-
al railway operator 
ONCF is running the 
service
French 
Development 
Agency 
Ethiopia/
Djibouti105
2016 Addis Ababa –
Djibouti
USD 4.5 
billion
7 
years
A Chinese consor-
tium, the China 
Railway Group (CREC) 
and the China Civil 
Engineering Con-
struction Corporation 
(CRCC)
China 
Exim Bank
(70 percent) 
and the Ethio-
pian govern-
ment
Tanzania Planned 
for Nov 
2019
Dar es Salaam – 
Morogoro
USD 1.92 
billion
/ Turkish firm Yapi 
Merkezi, through a 
joint venture with 
Portuguese company 
Mota Engil106
USD 1.46 
billion 
concessional 
loan from 
the Standard 
Chartered 
Bank’s Group
Source: PSIRU
•  corruption: in November 2018, Kenyan 
   authorities arrested seven CRBC officials 
   for bribing investigators looking into 
   corruption tied to the Standard Gauge 
   Railway.
•  racism: allegations of racism and 
   discrimination against Kenyan staff by 
   Chinese managers have been reported.101 
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Lesson 1: in comparison to the other 
publicly run metro lines in Seoul, the 
privatised metro line 9 resulted in poorer 
pay and working conditions for workers as 
well as low levels of passenger satisfaction.
Lesson 2: workers and civil society 
organisations can effectively campaign 
together to achieve remunicipalisation. 
Seoul’s metro is the world’s longest 
in terms of passenger-route length. It 
comprises nine lines, of which one is 
privately operated – line 9. The other lines 
are operated by a public corporation called 
Seoul Metro. Line 9 was built in three 
phases: a private operator runs section 1 
(Gaehwa to Sinnonhyeon station), while the 
public Seoul Metro now operates sections 
two and three. Sections two and three 
were initially privatised but subsequently 
brought in-house, as the result of a 
campaign led by the workers and their 
trade union.
Section one, which began operation in 
2009, was financed as a build-operate-
transfer (BOT) project, with 50 percent 
investment by Metro 9, a special purpose 
company (SPC) owned by a consortium 
of private companies with Hyundai Rotem 
and the Australian firm Macquarie as its 
two largest shareholders. In return Seoul 
Metropolitan City granted Metro 9 a 30-
year concession with exclusive rights to 
operate line 9. 
The original contract with Metro 9 shifted 
significant risk on to the government 
– to the advantage of the consortium. 
For example, the contract included a 
‘minimum revenue guarantee’ (MRG). The 
projected annual revenue (after tax) was 
8.9 percent of the capital invested. The 
MRG meant the government guaranteed 
most of this projected after-tax revenue 
for the first 15 years (to be precise 90 
percent MRG for the first five years, 80 
percent in the second five years and 70 
percent for the remaining 5 years). The 
MRG clause allowed Metro 9 shareholders 
to receive very high profits from building 
infrastructure, financing construction, 
and operating the metro line (the return 
on equity was 66 percent in 2009, 84 
percent in 2010, and 79 percent in 2011). 
This agreement meant that although Metro 
9 made substantial losses, it received 
significant financial subsidy from the 
government.107 Moreover, the contract gave 
the consortium a high level of autonomy to 
renegotiate fares.108
As a result of its financial losses, the Seoul 
government amended the contract with 
Metro 9 and restructured the project 
in 2013. The main changes included 
a complete replacement of Metro 9 
shareholders, the recovery of fare-setting 
rights by the Seoul government, the 
cancellation of the MRG agreement and 
a reduction of the guaranteed rate of 
profit now matched to market interest 
rates. Since 2013, a consortium of Korean 
investors has operated Line 9. However, 
re-contracting has also been an expensive 
undertaking for Seoul.
The workers and their trade union 
commissioned research on line 9, which 
came to the conclusion that EUR9.4 million 
(USD10.6 million) per year would be saved 
if the private contract was terminated 
and the operation provided directly by 
Metro 9.109 The outsourcing of the line 
9 operation was not only financially 
expensive, it also came with a social cost: 
workforce levels were lower and working 
conditions for line 9 workers were inferior 
to those on publically operated lines, 
putting passenger safety at risk. Workers 
felt conditions were intolerable. As a 
result, they organised and reached a union 
density of 90 percent, which is very high in 
a country where the average union density 
is 10 percent.110
Case study: 
SEOUL METRO LINE, KOREA
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Since 2017, the union has campaigned 
together with a coalition of civil society 
organisations to achieve remunicipalisation 
of the line. Their campaign has included 
various protest actions including a six-day 
strike at the end of 2017 with the threat of 
another in 2019, outreach to and surveys 
of passengers, press and media work 
and lobbying of the city government. 
Line 9 workers also received international 
solidarity from workers facing similar 
conditions in other countries.111
As a result of these efforts the Seoul City 
government and Metro 9 announced the 
cancellation of the operation contract 
with Seoul Line 9 Operation. Metro 9 
will now directly operate line 9’s section 
one with greater oversight from the city 
government.112 
This marks a first step towards 
remunicipalisation. The union and civil 
society are developing plans for the next 
phase of the campaign.113
6.2
GOVERNMENTAL SUBSIDIES AND TAXES
Case study: 
SWITZERLAND
Lesson 1: despite the EU’s drive for the 
liberalisation and privatisation of transport, 
railways in Switzerland (that is not in 
the EU) are mostly publicly owned. This 
has meant Switzerland has been able 
to maintain and extend public transport 
services that place service quality before 
profit. 
Lesson 2: Switzerland’s system of direct 
democracy facilitated investment in 
public transport. The Swiss electorate 
repeatedly voted for the funding of public 
transport and even prioritised it over road 
construction.  
Lesson 3: a proportion of the income 
gained from a federal gas tax and roadway 
tolling is earmarked for public transport.
Switzerland is renowned for its high-
quality and expansive public transport 
network. One of the biggest systems 
in Europe, Swiss cities and rural towns 
and villages enjoy well-maintained and 
regular transport connections. The 
network keeps on extending and so do 
passenger numbers. Passenger journeys 
saw an increase of 35 percent between 
2004 and 2014. In the same time period, 
railways were expanded by nearly 29 
percent, the local tramways increased the 
number of journeys made by 18 percent 
and bus traffic increased by 21 percent. 
Switzerland’s public transport system also 
stands out due to its integrated nature. 
Passengers are able to buy one ticket for 
multiple forms of transport, including 
trains, buses, ships and mountain cable 
cars. Moreover, services run on time: train 
punctuality is stable with exceptionally 
high rates of nearly 90 percent in 2012.114
Switzerland provides an example of 
an efficient, publicly-run rail system. 
The main railroad lines are operated 
by Swiss Federal Railways and owned by 
the Swiss Confederation. And while EU 
policies to promote liberalisation have 
led to the introduction of privately run rail 
companies in its member states, the Swiss 
Confederation, the cantons (federal states), 
and communes hold the vast majority 
of the capital of its railway companies 
(typically more than 90 percent).  
Switzerland’s system of direct democracy 
facilitated investment in public transport. 
The Swiss population has a direct say 
over public transport budgets at federal, 
cantonal and communal level. Citizens 
repeatedly backed the financing and 
extension of public transport. In 1998, 
for example, people voted in favour of 
the Federal Decree on Construction 
and Financing of Public Transport 
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Infrastructure Projects (FinPTO). This 
enabled Switzerland to significantly 
expand its rail infrastructure through large-
scale projects. The projects included Rail 
2000, the New Railway Link through the 
Alps (NRLA),115 a new connection to the 
European High-Speed Rail network (HSR) 
and rail noise reduction. The four projects’ 
combined cost of CHE31.5 billion (around 
USD34 billion; 1995 prices) was financed 
through a combination of a heavy goods 
vehicle charge, revenue from mineral oil 
tax and VAT (0.1 per cent).116
Additionally, in 2016 the Swiss electorate 
backed a proposal to use the entire 
proceeds from the mineral oil tax from the 
federal coffers to fund public transport 
rather than road building. This signifies 
a significant amount of funding, as taxes 
on petrol have risen consistently (by 178 
percent between 1990 and 2012) and 
make up almost half of Switzerland’s retail 
petrol price. 
Case study: 
BRT INFRASTRUCTURE, COLOMBIA
Lesson 1: the initial BRT infrastructure was 
to a large extent financed through a fuel 
tax. 
Lesson 2: the BRT in Bogota is operated 
by private companies and operates at 
near cost recovery. Despite a pro-poor 
subsidy scheme most of the urban poor 
are excluded from the system. 
In 2000, Bogota, the capital of Colombia, 
opened a BRT, also called Transmilenio. 
Today the network covers over 100km and 
transports 2 million passengers per day.117 
The total cost of the initial infrastructure 
of the BRT was USD240 million. This Figure 9: funding of public transport 
in Switzerland
Source:Federal Office for Transport, Swiss Transport 
Policy From A To Z, 2016
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Public funding for public transport is 
drawn from general budgets as well as 
passenger fares (see figure 9). Currently 
public transport generates enough 
revenue to cover more than half of its 
costs. The rest is drawn from public 
subsidies and infrastructure contribution.
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was financed to a large extent through a 
fuel tax (46 percent), local revenues (28 
percent), a credit from the World Bank 
(6 percent) and grants from the national 
government (20 percent).118
For stages 2-4 in the development 
the BRT, Bogota also received climate 
finance through the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) and the sale of Certified 
Emission Reductions (CERs) on the 
compliance carbon market. In 2006 it 
received USD360 million through CDM, 
which had predicted 246,563 (tonnes 
of CO2 equivalent) in estimated annual 
emission reductions. This was used for 
infrastructure measures (dedicated bus 
lanes and bus stations to support transfer 
to feeder services), and new and larger 
buses with improved fuel efficiency per 
passenger transported. The CDM covered 
10 percent of total project cost; the rest 
of the funding came from the national and 
regional government.119
A city-owned company manages the 
BRT; TransMilenio S.A awards concession 
contracts to private companies that 
operate the system and are responsible 
for fare collection. The bus operating 
companies are granted concessions for 
certain routes and paid on the number 
of kilometres they operate. TransMilenio 
sets the schedules and routes for the 
service. The private companies maintain 
their operations through fare collection. 
As no public subsidies were provided to 
fund equipment acquisition or operation, 
TransMilenio is designed to recover 100 
percent of its operational costs through 
passenger fares. Any increase in revenue 
from expanded ridership goes directly to 
the operators.120 In order to extract the 
maximum profits, the operating companies 
put a lot of emphasis on financial savings, 
which had detrimental effects on working 
conditions and service quality.121
This system also led to high levels of 
transport poverty. In 2011, 66 percent 
of the households in Bogota belonged 
to the lowest income ranges, with a 
household income of less than USD680 
per year. These households spend more 
than 20 percent of their income on 
transport and in some areas this reached 
28 percent.122 The housing and transport 
indicator recommends a 15 percent 
spend on transport (see section 3), which 
is considerably less than the 28 percent 
spent by Bogota’s citizens. To address 
the issue of transport poverty, Bogota 
introduced a public transit subsidy system. 
The subsidy amounted to a 45 percent 
discount for trunk services, and 53 percent 
discount for feeder services. It remains 
capped at 40 trips per month. However, 
research suggests that an estimated 68 
percent of the intended beneficiaries of 
the subsidy system are still excluded.123 
This stands in stark contrast to the publicly 
owned and operated BRT in Quito, 
Ecuador where fare prices (USD0.25 per 
journey) are very low.124
As part of Bogota’s 2006 mobility 
masterplan, an Integrated Public 
Transport System (SITP) was developed to 
complement the Transmilenio with feeder 
services and further citywide bus routes 
operating in normal traffic. In addition to 
this formal public transport system, an 
informal bicycle system, bicitaxis, has 
operated in the city. Research in 2013 
found that around 8,000 people worked 
in the informal bicitaxi sector. In reality, 
the number of workers is likely to be 
much higher. Since 2004 there have been 
several attempts to regulate the bicitaxi 
sector, but so far this has not happened. 
While bicitaxis are not allowed to operate 
everywhere (especially where formal 
transport routes exist) they are tolerated in 
side streets and feed into the BRT stations. 
The bicitaxis address a demand that is 
currently not, and unlikely to be, covered 
by the integrated public transport system 
SITP even when fully implemented.125 
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6.3       
CROSS-SUBSIDISING AND    
PUBLIC-PUBLIC-PARTNERSHIPS
Case study: 
MUNICH, GERMANY
Lesson 1: Munich, like other cities in 
Germany, experienced a decrease in 
national funding for public transport, 
leading to an increasing deficit in the 
Munich Transport Company (MVG). Its 
parent company, Munich’s public utility 
(Stadtwerke Muenchen-SWM), balanced 
this debt with the surplus achieved in its 
electricity sector. 
Lesson 2: since 2015, Munich’s public 
utility, which is not only in charge of public 
transport but also electricity supply, 
provides renewable energy for all of 
Munich’s metro, trams and electro buses. 
Munich is reversing the tide of 
privatisation.  In the words of Munich’s 
mayor, Dieter Reiter:
In an alarming number of cases, the 
results of privatization were highly 
problematic and do not seem to indicate 
that privatization can be seen as a silver 
bullet. That is especially true for sectors 
that are prone to producing monopoly 
or oligopoly structures such as energy 
supply, public transport or water supply. 
[…] In the history of privatization of local 
public transport, more often than not, 
the services provided were reduced 
dramatically and the prices saw steep 
increases.”126
In order to decrease individual motorised 
transport and to reduce CO2 emissions, 
Munich developed a high-performing, 
publicly-run, local, public transport 
system. In Munich, public transport is 
100 percent owned and operated by 
the municipality. Munich’s Transport 
Federation (MVG), which is a subsidiary of 
Munich’s public utility (SWM), is Germany’s 
second largest municipal transport 
enterprise.
Public transport in Germany is funded 
by federal, state, and local governments, 
as well as through passenger fares. 
Legislative changes to the organisation of 
public transport in Germany in the 1990s, 
alongside EU regulations calling for more 
competition between operators, increased 
pressure upon local authorities. The 
German Railways (DB) was transformed 
from an administrative unit of the federal 
government to a private company owned 
by the German federal government, and 
cities and counties became responsible 
for the planning and funding of public 
transport.127 While the demands on public 
transport increased, the federal funding 
for public transport largely remained the 
same. 
To deal with federal budget constraints, 
the SWM subsidised public transport by 
using the surplus made in its electricity 
supply division. This covered the MVG’s 
deficit. In Germany such municipal 
cross-financing of public services 
provides a common form of funding for 
public services that cannot be funded 
by passenger fares alone and remain 
equitable. Public swimming pools are 
subsidised in a similar way, for example. 
The integration of different public 
services also allowed Munich to become 
a forerunner in green transport. Since 
January 2018, all trams and the metro have 
run on renewable electricity, produced 
by Munich’s public utility. In other words, 
trains and trams are now 100 percent CO2 
free. Moreover, Munich’s fleet of electric 
vehicles is growing and with MVG Rad it 
has also developed a public bike-rental 
system.
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Case study: 
INTERNATIONAL RAIL LINK, 
FRANCE-SPAIN
Lesson 1: failed PPPs and bankruptcy 
forced the two governments to take on 
heavy financial obligations, which were 
ultimately absorbed by both taxpayer and 
service users. 
Lesson 2: in order to attract private 
investment the PPP’s risk was loaded 
onto governments, which effectively 
incentivises private firms to take on 
projects likely to end in bankruptcy. 
Lesson 3: the Spanish and French 
governments set up a joint venture to 
run the international rail link themselves 
following the failure of the PPP. This option 
would have proved substantially cheaper 
had it been their first choice. 
In October 1995, Spain and France signed 
an international agreement to construct 
and operate the cross-border section of 
the high-speed rail (HSR) line in order 
to connect both countries by rail across 
the Pyrenees. The Figueres-Perpignan 
line is 44.4km long, of which 19.8 are 
in Spain and 24.6 in France. In terms of 
construction, the most challenging section 
was the 8.3km twin-bore tunnel (Perthus 
Tunnel) and for it the countries sought 
private sector involvement. A number of 
contractual sweeteners were added to 
attract a private contractor. For example, 
it was agreed the company would receive 
subsidies from both states, as well as from 
the EU. The concession holder would also 
be granted the right to charge a toll for 
traffic on the line (of mixed passenger-
freight services) and receive a guarantee 
of a minimum threshold of traffic in the 
long-term.
In 2003, the TP Ferro group was awarded 
the contract for the construction and 
operation of the HSR line. Two private 
construction companies jointly owned 
TP Ferro: Spain’s ACS (50 percent) 
and France’s Eiffage (50 percent). The 
concession term period was 50 years. 
Initially the budget for the project was 
EUR952 million (USD1.1 billion), but its final 
cost was EUR1184 million (USD1.3 billion). 
The majority of funding came in the form 
of direct grants from the governments of 
France and Spain and both governments 
contributed additional funding to ensure 
the viability of the concession. The other 
main finance came in the form of debt and 
equity (the shareholders’ contribution). 
It is noteworthy that equity in TP Ferro 
represented less than 10 percent of total 
construction costs, and that more than 
50 percent of the equity came from third-
party loans.128 
The construction work began at the end 
of 2004 and was completed in February 
2009, but the implementation of the 
contract was poor. The lack of connections 
with domestic lines caused compensation 
payments to the concessionaire and the 
extension of the concession of three 
additional years.  However, in 2013 it 
became clear that the forecasted demand 
for the line was overly optimistic. While TP 
Ferro had expected to run 24 trains a day 
on average in the first year of operation 
and then eventually 30 trains a day, in 
reality only 12 trains per day ran in 2014’s 
high season.129
It was, therefore, unsurprising that, more 
than a decade after the concession was 
awarded, TP Ferro entered into financial 
difficulty declaring financial losses of 
EUR112.8 million (USD128 million). Again, 
the Spanish company ACS (the effective 
leader of the PPP) sought compensation 
from the Spanish government in the form 
of EUR80 million (USD90 million) and 
a 25-year extension on the concession 
(until 2082). However, both governments 
refused to grant this. In 2016, TP Ferro 
went into liquidation, the concession 
was cancelled, and a new joint venture 
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involving the French and Spanish 
governments took over the international 
high-speed rail link between the two 
countries.130 
6.4       
CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE FUNDING        
OF PUBLIC TRANSPORT
Case study: 
TALINN, ESTONIA
Lesson 1: free transport in Tallinn 
increased the city’s tax incomes. As more 
people than previously officially registered 
in Tallinn in order to benefit from free 
transport, they therefore had to pay a city 
tax, which roughly covered the cost of 
fare-free transport.
Lesson 2: public transport usage increases 
and private car usage decreases as a result 
of fare-free transport options.
Tallinn, with approximately 420,000 
residents, is the first European capital and 
the largest city in the world offering fare-
free public transport. After a referendum 
in which 75 percent of the people said 
that they were in favour of fare-free public 
transport, Tallinn made its public transport 
free for residents in 2013. Residents had to 
register and for an administrative charge 
of EUR2 (USD2.30) received a ‘green’ card 
with which they could access the five tram 
lines, eight trolley bus lines and 57 bus 
lines in the city. 
In 2012, before introducing fare-free public 
transport, 40 percent of all trips in Tallinn 
were made by public transport and 30 
percent of the trips were made on foot. 
By international standards, this was high 
usage and largely due to tickets being 
cheaper compared to other European 
cities; a ticket cost EUR1 (USD1.3) in 
December 2012. Additionally, Tallinn had 
already operated fare exemptions for 
certain groups, such as children and the 
elderly people.131 
Despite their low cost, fares were the 
main reason for user dissatisfaction with 
public transport according to a satisfaction 
survey carried out in 2010. In addition, 
the trend of public transport usage was 
negative. Public transport trips had 
decreased dramatically over the previous 
two decades. At the same time, the 
motorisation rate had more than doubled: 
in 2012 there were 456 cars per 1,000 
residents.132
One year after the introduction of fare-free 
public transport, the number of trips by 
public transport increased by 14 percent. 
People’s satisfaction with the public 
transport system increased. Financially, 
the fare-free public transport system 
almost paid for itself. It is estimated that 
42 percent of residents were previously 
un-registered for tax. In order to attain 
the green card for fare-free travel they 
registered and Tallinn gained 11,000 
new taxpayers. On average, each newly 
registered person paid Eur 1,000 in 
income tax to the city. Approximately 
EUR11 million (USD12.4 million), almost 
equivalent to the lost income from tickets, 
was made through the additional income 
tax.133 While Tallinn is an example of how 
free transport can generate additional 
income by providing an incentive for 
people to pay their taxes, it is too early to 
tell if the system is sustainable, especially 
when infrastructure investments need to 
be made.
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Case study: 
MEXICO
Lesson 1: switching to zero-emission 
technology demands higher up-front costs 
but is significantly cheaper in the long run. 
Lesson 2: climate finance initiatives 
promote private-sector involvement. 
However, the World Bank also points out 
that the high initial costs for sourcing the 
bus fleet and low profit margins are a 
disincentive to private operators. As such, 
the public sector is better positioned 
to engage with financing zero-emission 
buses.
Mexico is among Latin America’s most 
carbon-intensive economies, and its 
transport sector is one of the main 
causes.134 Research suggests that while 
heavy-duty vehicles make up only 5 
percent of the on-road fleet in Mexico, 
two-thirds of the health impacts are 
caused by the on-road transportation 
sector.135 Urban buses produce one-
quarter of black carbon emissions from 
road transport, despite constituting only 
1 percent of the global on-road vehicle 
fleet.136 Several international organisations 
and lobby groups advocate for electric 
buses, such as the World Bank, the Climate 
& Clean Air Coalition (CCAC), International 
Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT), 
United Nations Environment, C40 Cities, 
and Centro Mario Molina–Chile (CMMCh). 
As part of the C40 cities (a network of over 
90 mega cities backed by financial data 
and media company Bloomberg) Mexico 
City was one of the first mega-cities across 
the world that committed to de-carbonise 
the transport sector by switching to 
electric buses.137 The bus corridor on Eje 
8 Sur will be 22km long and serve an 
estimated 160,000 daily trips, providing 
connections with five Metro lines and one 
Metrobus Bus Rapid Transit line. 
In order to finance the shift to sustainable 
mobility, Mexico’s central government 
created the Public Transportation Federal 
Support Program (PROTRAM) in 2009. 
PROTRAM offers grants to subnational 
governments for up to 50 percent 
of the infrastructure costs of public 
transportation projects.138 Climate finance 
matched this from different institutions. 
For example, the Global Environment 
Facility’s (GEF) Sustainable Transport 
and Air Quality Program released a 
USD5.4 million grant, the World Bank’s 
International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development provided USD150 million and 
the World Bank’s Clean Technology Fund 
USD200 million which, via the National 
Bank for Public Works and Services (Banco 
Nacional de Obras y Servicios Públicos, 
BANOBRAS), makes loans to states, 
municipalities, and the private sector to 
complement PROTRAM. PROTRAM’s has 
planned 40 projects (of which seven are 
already in operation) with total investments   
of around USD3.5 billion.139
While switching to zero-emission 
technology does demand higher up-front 
costs, it is significantly cheaper in the 
long run.140             Yet, instead of highlighting 
the comparative advantage of a publicly 
operated zero-emission bus service, 
the World Bank recommends pilots with 
large private operators, who may then 
send positive signals to the rest of the 
market and to transfer technology risks 
onto public authorities.141
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annual revenue increases of nine 
percent. But passenger numbers did 
not meet the projected expectations. 
Consequently, GNER left the contract 
when its parent company, Sea Containers, 
faced bankruptcy.144 In 2007, National 
Express replaced GNER, but faced the 
same problems in that revenue was not 
as high as expected. National Express 
incurred high indebtedness and ultimately 
abandoned the contract. The East Coast 
line was taken back into public ownership 
in 2009 by the then-Labour government.145
During the years that the East Coast line 
was publicly owned and managed – from 
2009 to 2015 – the service improved 
significantly. Customer satisfaction 
and punctuality rose, despite existing 
infrastructure problems. Moreover, the 
operation was more financially stable. 
Costs were saved since it did not need 
to pay dividends to shareholders – it 
managed to return GBP1 billion (USD1.3 
billion) in premium payments to the 
government.146 Despite the success of 
the public ownership and management 
of the East Coast line and the previous 
bad experience with its privatisation, the 
Conservative-led government decided in 
2015 to privatise the East Coast line again. 
Stagecoach and Virgin signed a deal to 
run the East Coast line from 2015 to 2023, 
promising to pay the government GBP3.3 
billion (USD4.4 billion) to run the service. 
Stagecoach owned 90 percent of the joint 
venture and Virgin owned the remaining 
10 percent. Two years later, at the end of 
2017, Stagecoach and Virgin withdrew 
from operating the service three years 
early, after running into   difficulties.147 
However, just shortly after dropping out 
of the East Coast line contract due to 
financial difficulty, it became public that 
Virgin and Stagecoach shared GBP51.2m 
(USD68 million) worth of dividends from 
the West Coast main line railway, which 
they also operated.148
6. 5.       
INSOURCING PUBLIC TRANSPORT: 
RENATIONALISATION AND 
REMUNICIPALISATION  
  
Case study: 
EAST COAST, UK
Lesson 1: rail privatisation in the UK led to 
a fragmented and inefficient rail system. 
This is clearly demonstrated by the East 
Coast train link, which has had to be 
taken back into national ownership twice 
following failed privatisations.
Lesson 2: motivated by profit, rail 
operators made unrealistic bids in order 
to win the contract. While shareholders 
benefitted, debt increased and eventually 
the government renationalised the service 
only to make it fit for re-privatisation.
Lesson 3: during the time of 
renationalisation, the East Cost line ran on 
a surplus and punctuality and customer 
satisfaction improved.  
In the UK, franchising (the breaking up of 
the rail network to facilitate a competitive 
market  for private providers) was part and 
parcel of the UK’s rail privatistion strategy 
that was introduced in the 1990s by the 
Conservative government. It was believed 
that this would improve the service and 
reduce the government’s subsidies for rail 
transport.142
The story of the East Coast line is an 
example of the failure of rail privatisation 
in the UK, as operators – in order to win 
tenders – made overoptimistic calculations 
leading to a decline in the quality of 
the service. The private operators of 
East Coast Rail entered into difficulties 
and pulled out of the contract three 
times.143 First, in 2005, East Coast line 
was subcontracted to Great Northern 
Eastern Railway (GNER) after it agreed 
to a premium payment of GBP1.3 billion 
(USD1.7 billion) over 10 years, assuming 
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7.       
Conclusion
While funding options for public transport 
will vary between countries and cities, there 
are a number of general lessons that can 
be learned about the financing of public 
transport detailed in this chapter.
First, PPPs do not guarantee better value 
for money. While the World Bank and other 
institutions are keen to argue that the private 
sector has the capacity to catalyse the 
investment needed for public transport, PPP’s 
are usually expensive, as profits are siphoned 
to shareholders. The case of metro line 9 in 
Seoul, South Korea and the East Coast rail line 
in the UK clearly demonstrate that the service 
can be run more efficiently and cheaply when 
publicly owned and managed. 
As shown by the example of the East Coast 
rail, private operators are quick to abandon 
a contract when they cannot make sufficient 
profit. Consequently, there is a high rate 
of PPP failures in transport. According to 
the Asian Development Bank, the failure 
rate of PPPs is especially high in the Asian 
transport sector, which has seen more failed 
than completed PPPs. To counter this, the 
World Bank and other financial institutions 
recommend better risk sharing between 
local, regional and national governments.             
Yet, the consequences of this strategy are 
overly optimistic projects that overestimate 
the private operator’s financial capacity, 
which are ultimately financed by government 
and international institutions, although 
the private operator (and its shareholders) 
reap the profit. This is illustrated by the 
example of the France-Spain international 
rail-link, where the equity of the contractor, 
TP Ferro, represented less than 10 percent 
of total construction costs. The shifting 
of risk on to the state also brought about 
minimum revenue guarantee (MRG) clauses in 
contracts. The case of metro line 9 in Seoul, 
South Korea showed how the contractor 
could take advantage of this clause to make 
Case study: 
BRT, FORT MCMURRAY, CANADA
Lesson 1: privatisation of the bus transit 
led to understaffing and frequent delays 
and bus cancellations.
Lesson 2: following remunicipalisation, the 
quality of the bus transit service improved 
and the staff benefited from better 
working conditions. 
In 2013, the company Tok Ltd won a 
15-year contract to run the standard 
and specialised transit services for Fort 
McMurray. Services started to deteriorate 
shortly after the privatisation. Within the 
first six months of 2014, there were 1,853 
delays and 59 missed trips reported. 
Customer complaints rose drastically. Just 
two years after the privatisation, a public 
audit found that Tok Transit Ltd was not 
following staffing requirements, had not 
kept to the timescale for constructing 
a bus facility and customer complaints 
had risen to an unacceptable level.149 
The local government’s transit service 
branch was not in the position to monitor 
the private contractors’ finances and 
system utilisation. Following the results 
of this audit, in February 2015 the 
Regional Municipality of Wood Buffalo 
exercised a contract provision allowing 
for cancellation without reason at 90 
days’ notice. Following remunicipalisation, 
(supported by the system’s workers) fares 
and the bus schedules remained the 
same150 and service quality improved.151
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excessive profits while simultaneously 
being compensated by the government, as 
‘expected’ revenues were not achieved. 
PPPs come at a social cost, with even the UN 
highlighting that privatization often involves 
the systematic elimination of human rights 
protections.152 In public transport, privatisation 
has undermined working conditions, led to a 
deterioration of the service and higher fare 
prices. Poorer populations have been priced 
out of the services. In Fort McMurray, Canada 
the privatisation of the bus rapid transit (BRT) 
immediately caused a sharp rise in delays 
and cancellations and a worsening of working 
conditions with, for example, the company 
not meeting basic staffing requirements. 
Also, in the case of metro line 9 in Seoul, 
the working conditions were worse than on 
the eight other publicly run metro lines. In 
Bogota, Colombia, the privately operated BRT 
is unaffordable for most of the urban poor. In 
contrast, in Quito, the capital of neighbouring 
Ecuador, the BRT is publicly run and prices 
are low. 
Another myth about PPPs is that they ensure 
complete transparency. In fact, the opposite 
is often the case, as contracts are kept secret 
from the public. Elsewhere, Public Services 
International Research Unit (PSIRU) research 
has shown that PPPs provide an incentive for 
corruption, as they offer a one-off opportunity 
to secure a government-backed revenue 
stream often lasting for decades.153 This is 
also illustrated by the case of Kenya’s high-
speed standard gauge railway (SGR), where 
the contract was kept confidential allowing 
corruption in the project process. In Kenya’s 
case, the PPP contract was conditional 
on awarding the contract to a particular 
(Chinese) company, putting the company in 
a very powerful position to the detriment of 
the workers, the environment and the general 
public. 
Yet, despite the negative consequences of 
PPPs, the use of PPPs in public transport is 
rising, especially if transport infrastructure 
is taken into account – usually Build Operate 
and Transfer (BOT) contracts and in urban 
rail projects. The private sector may have an 
increased interest in these areas as they are 
regarded as two areas in the public transport 
sector that are profitable. There are two main 
reasons for the continued increase in PPPs. 
First, their continued promotion (in transport 
and other public services) by the World Bank 
and other international financial institutions 
appears to have an ideological component 
attached to it. Questioning the efficacy of 
PPPs may be seen as questioning neoliberal 
policymaking as a whole. 
Second, PPPs may be used for tactical 
rather than sustainable reasons, as they offer 
government a way to finance infrastructure 
and public services while keeping official 
debt figures low. This is a significant matter, 
especially for countries where donor 
obligations or other multinational agreements 
bind them to keep debt level low. Of course, 
in reality the government is still liable for the 
investment through taxation, but PPPs offer a 
simple method by which debt can be kept off 
the books. 
Amid the championing of private-sector 
involvement, alternative models of finance 
are often dismissed. Yet to create and extend 
public transport that meets the requirements 
of rapid urbanisation, is accessible to all and 
is environmentally sustainable; a publicly 
owned and controlled public transport 
system is the only answer.154 Switzerland’s 
model provides the best example of this, 
where public transport remains in public 
hands. Switzerland maintains and has 
expanded a public transport network that 
puts the quality of the service before profit. 
Switzerland’s system of direct democracy 
has repeatedly backed investment in public 
transport and this confirms research on 
participatory budgeting that suggests the 
funding of basic services is a vote winner 
and that, if given a say, people will  back it. 
In Tallinn, Estonia, a referendum led to the 
introduction of fare-free public transport. 
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Tallinn’s case demonstrates that the funding 
of public transport is a political decision 
rather than a financial one. Tallinn is not 
alone in this experience. Due to the many 
social and environmental benefits of public 
transport, a number of cities across the 
world are opting to make public transport 
fare-free. The move involves a change of 
perspective that recognises public transport 
as a common good and not a commodity 
similar to other public services.155 Tallinn’s 
experience illustrates that fare-free public 
transport is both popular and has enabled 
Tallinn to mobilise additional city income tax. 
The additional income from that tax provided 
a significant proportion of the finance for the 
fare-free transport policy. 
By drawing on examples across the world 
this chapter showcases some creative ways 
of how public transport can be financed in a 
sustainable way and that does not come at 
a cost to workers, the urban poor and rural 
populations. 
One opportunity to fund public transport lies 
in Public-Public Partnerships (PuPs) that are 
based on solidarity rather than profit seeking 
and have offered a vital funding opportunity 
in other public services. Another way to 
mobilise finances for public transport is to 
cross-subsidise across public services. As 
the Munich case study illustrates, this is a 
successful way to fund public services that 
if financed by user-fees alone would exclude 
the poorer population. 
Climate finance provides an emerging 
funding stream for the financing of public 
transport if it addresses specific climate 
change mitigation or adaptation interventions. 
The BRTs in Bogota, Colombia, and Mexico 
City, Mexico were, in part, funded by climate 
finance. However, caution is required here, 
as climate finance often encourages, or even 
requires, private-sector participation.
Public transport is fundamental to public 
health and social and economic equality. 
It is also integral to addressing climate 
change and creating a sustainable future 
economy. This report demonstrates that the 
public sector has a comparative advantage 
in delivering public transport services 
that reflects the needs of the users, the 
environment and the workers. Workers within 
their trade unions and users can join forces 
in campaigns for better public transport 
for all. In the cases of metro line 9 in Seoul, 
South Korea and the BRT in Fort McMurray, 
Canada people power brought about the 
remunicipalisation and subsequent successful 
operation of the transport services.
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8.      
POLICY      
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
TRADE UNIONS
1. Trade unions can defend public transport 
from privatisations. The evidence presented 
here demonstrates that private-sector 
involvement hinges on the pursuit of profit 
and that this results in fare increases often 
coupled with wage cuts and poorer working 
conditions for workers. 
2. If public services are already privatised 
then trade unions can join forces with 
passengers and civil society organisations 
to campaign for their renationalisation or 
remunicipalisation. Scheduled contract 
renewal periods or private operator 
bankruptcy offer key opportunities to 
campaign for the insourcing of services. 
However, a case-specific cost-benefit 
analysis can also reveal that it is cheaper to 
remunicipalise/renationalise mid-contract 
even when facing compensation costs. 
3. The financing of public transport always 
needs to be seen in a wider context. Public 
transport – regardless of whether it is 
privatised or not – will be dependent upon 
government subsidies and will therefore 
reflect general budgetary decisions and 
fiscal policies. As such, progressive and 
redistributive taxation and measures to 
combat tax evasion are central to raising 
funds for public transport.
4. Unions should cost private transport. 
In most countries, public subsidies for 
road networks far outstrip those for public 
transport, despite the negative consequences 
of road travel for the environment and health 
and safety. In comparison, public transport 
has a positive impact upon the economy, 
environment and people’s quality of life.
5. Earmarking specific income streams/
taxes could guarantee a sustainable income 
for public transport. For example, incomes 
from fuel tax or toll roads have been used 
to finance public transport in Switzerland, 
Colombia and the USA. 
6. Employers benefit from public transport 
and can therefore also be made to contribute 
to it, either through a special tax or by making 
them responsible for subsidising employees’ 
transport costs.
7. Cross subsidy of public services offers 
another opportunity for sustainable public 
transport. Munich’s transport system is part 
financed by its electricity sector. This form of 
cross subsidisation has another advantage: 
the publicly-owned and controlled electricity 
sector provides green energy for the public 
transport system.
8. In many cities across the world a more 
integrated and expansive public transport 
system can be established by formalising 
an existing informal sector. However, 
formalisation policies must consider the 
needs of informal sector workers. While 
additional subsidies may be necessary for the 
formalisation of the informal sector so that 
it benefits passengers as well as workers, in 
many cases it would offer an efficient way to 
expand the public transport system.
9. Public transport is an equality issue and 
thus highly relevant to current and future 
trade union members. Accessible public 
transport improves public health, contributes 
to social and economic equality and mitigates 
climate change. It is therefore crucial that 
financing public transport is a policy priority. 
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